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Twenty-five years after the Chapultepec Peace Accords brought an end to El Salvador’s civil war
(1980-1992), the tiny Central American nation continues to struggle with deep political polarization,
rampant violence, and an anemic economy that fails to provide adequate employment or living
standards for a large section of the population.
Little wonder that the 25th-anniversary event held Jan. 16 in San Salvador was a rather “downbeat”
affair, as The Economist reported, or that the keynote speaker, President Salvador Sánchez Cerén,
used the moment to call for “new national accords” so that Salvadorans might finally have the
country they “dreamed of” and “a culture of peace.”
The peace agreements, signed in 1992 at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City, marked a major turning
point after 12 years of open warfare between US-backed security forces and the Frente Farabundo
Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) guerrilla coalition. The conflict killed more than 70,000
people and displaced roughly a quarter of El Salvador’s populace, according to the UN Commission
on the Truth for El Salvador, convened in 1992 as part of the Chapultepec agreement. Thousands
more went missing, never to be seen or heard from again.
In an essay published last month on the teleSUR website, writer Hector Perla Jr., a Salvadoran
who grew up in the US but was in San Salvador the day the final peace deal was signed, recalled
the jubilant scene he witnessed in the capital’s central square. “I realized something had radically
changed in the country,” he wrote. “That day, as a nation, we buried the past. We buried an entire
history, since colonial times, of hundreds of years of brutal dictatorship without even the pretense of
democracy.”
One of the keys to the peace agreements is that they allowed FMLN guerrillas to enter mainstream
politics and compete head-on, without violent reprisals, against the hard-right Alianza Republicana
Nacionalista (ARENA) party, the political arm of their wartime enemies. ARENA controlled the
government for two decades, starting in 1989. Little by little, however, the FMLN gained ground,
finally winning the presidency in 2009 (NotiCen, March 19, 2009). The party won again in 2014, when
Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla comandante (commander) who participated directly in the peace
negotiations, narrowly beat ARENA candidate Norman Quijano.

Age-old antagonisms
That the two parties have managed to coexist all these years, with the right eventually ceding control
of government to the FMLN, is testament to the real and lasting effectiveness of the Chapultepec
Peace Accords, observers say. “It’s rare in the world to see two former military opponents be able
to participate peacefully in a system of government with democratic elections,” Douglass Cassel,
a legal advisor with the truth commission who now works with the Kroc Institute for International
Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame in the US, told CNN Español.
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That’s not to say, however, that the two sides have ever really mended fences or found a way to
cooperate. Decades after the war, the FMLN, ARENA, and their respective supporters still have a
highly antagonistic relationship that, if anything, was only exacerbated by the election of Sánchez
Cerén. It didn’t help that the former comandante won the 2014 runoff by fewer than 6,400 votes
(NotiCen, March 20, 2014).
In recent years, those tensions have had serious repercussions on the country’s finances. ARENA
has sided with other opposition parties to limit the Sánchez Cerén administration’s access to outside
funding. They have also refused, so far, to approve the 2017 budget, further complicating matters
for a country whose economy is growing at a snail’s pace and continues to depend heavily on
remittances sent home by the more than 2 million Salvadorans estimated to be residing in the
US. The political acrimony “doesn’t allow for a vision of the country,” Luis Mario Rodríguez of
FUSADES (Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social), a pro-business thinktank, told The Economist.
The divide is so entrenched that the two sides are once again turning to the UN for help, just as
they did 25 years ago. During last month’s anniversary event, President Sánchez Cerén took the
opportunity to introduce a special UN envoy, Benito Andión of Mexico, who is being called on to
“facilitate dialogue.” Andión served as Mexico’s ambassador to El Salvador in the mid 1990s.
“The sad reality is that UN intervention is necessary,” ARENA lawmaker Mauricio Vargas, a
former general who, like Sánchez Cerén, was one of the signatories of the 1992 agreement, told
the independent news site El Faro. “We have achieved an understanding. The two sides haven’t
made space for each other. Tension is mounting, and experience tells us that eventually things can
explode.”

Crime conundrum
Another very much unresolved problem for El Salvador is violence, which may not be of the political
variety, as it was during the 1980s, but is all too present nonetheless. Murderous street gangs
known as maras operate throughout the country, fighting police and each other for control of entire
communities, terrorizing residents, and forcing local businesses to pay extortion money. The state
has reacted with increasingly repressive tactics, passing legislation that defines gang activity as
“terrorism” and giving police and soldiers what essentially amounts to a license to kill (NotiCen,
May 26, 2016).
The result has been a staggering amount of bloodshed, even by El Salvador’s own skewed
standards. In 2015, more than 6,600 people were murdered, a macabre milestone for a country
that, in terms of both population numbers and land area, is roughly the size of the US state of
Massachusetts (NotiCen, Jan. 21, 2016). Homicide numbers fell last year by roughly 20%, but the
death toll from what some describe as a “crime war” still topped 5,000, giving El Salvador a per
capita murder rate of roughly 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, among the highest in the world
(NotiCen, Jan. 5, 2017). By way of comparison, the homicide rate in the US as of 2013 was less than 4
per 100,000 inhabitants, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
Analysts say the violence is both a product of––and contributing factor to––El Salvador’s deepseated economic problems, which the Chapultepec Peace Accords—as transformative as they may
have been on the political front—did little to improve. Marginalized and with few legitimate work
prospects, impoverished youth turn to the gangs, which have a suffocating effect on the economy by
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squeezing local businesses and forcing both the public and private sectors to spend their respective
resources on security rather than on things like education or business investments.
“The structural causes that gave rise to the conflict weren’t negotiated, they weren’t resolved by the
signing of the Peace Accords,” Roberto Cañas, an FMLN co-founder who has since parted ways with
the party, said in a recent interview with the Colombian weekly magazine Semana. “The inequality
and social exclusion are still there, and they’re the ingredients of the country’s current conflict.
There were 5,000 deaths in 2106, 14 per day.”

Time for new talks?
The Sánchez Cerén administration indicated initially that it would take a prevention-oriented
approach to the country’s crime epidemic. It promised job training for youth, infrastructure
improvements for high crime areas, and increased education spending, among other things
(NotiCen, Jan. 29, 2015). In practice, however, government policy has been more stick than carrot,
observers say, a return to the mano dura (iron-fisted) strategies employed by the conservative
administrations of President Antonio Saca (2004-2009) and his predecessor, the late Francisco Flores
(1999-2004).
The heavy-handed tactics mark a departure from the previous government’s tenuous and never
very transparent attempt to negotiate with gang leaders. Behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the
Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) administration helped bring about a tregua (truce) between gangs that,
for about two years, starting in March 2012, brought murder numbers down to approximately 2,500
annually (NotiCen, Dec. 20, 2012, and June 27, 2013). The politically untenable tregua experiment
unraveled in the buildup to the 2014 election, and President Sánchez Cerén—who served as vicepresident under Funes—has since made it clear that he is neither interested nor willing to negotiate
with the maras.
Recent events, however, may end up testing that resolve. In late December, reporters from El Faro
met in secret with several high-ranking members of Mara Salvatrucha, the largest of El Salvador’s
street gangs. Two weeks later, the award-winning news site published details of the encounter
and revealed that Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13, is keen to hold peace talks with the
government. Remarkably, the gang members even said they would consider disbanding. Several
days later, the Sureños branch of the country’s other leading gang, Barrio 18, made a similar
overture, suggesting in their case that they’d not only be willing to disband, but also help authorities
locate the bodies of missing murder victims.
The reports have caught the attention of Catholic Church leaders, who are offering to mediate
should the government eventually agree to talks. For now, the Sánchez Cerén administration and its
allies continue to dismiss that possibility. Some opposition members, however, see potential peace
talks as an option that’s at least worth exploring. “We can’t listen to [the gangs] say they want to
disband and not pay attention,” ARENA lawmaker René Portillo Cuadra told El Faro. “We should
take [the offer] seriously and sit down and talk with them, within the framework of the law.”

-- End --
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